Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law? by Easterbrook, Frank H.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1982
Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?
Frank H. Easterbrook
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank H. Easterbrook, Response, "Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?", 60 Texas Law Review 705 (1982).
Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?
Frank H. Easterbrook*
The editors of the Texas Law Review asked me to respond to the
essays by Professor Sullivan and Mr. Litvack, doubtless as a represent-
ative of the Chicago Branch of the Stanford School of Antitrust. I have
tried not to disappoint them.
I
The theme of both essays is that there is (or should be) a ratchet in
antitrust law. Once there was a Golden Age of Antitrust, in which
judges tempered economic learning with political and class conscious-
ness, protecting the good society and the yeomen of business-Justice
Peckham's "small dealers and worthy men"-from the depredations
of large and rapacious firms. During that Golden Age, America and its
judges were brave and generous. Now hard times are upon us, and the
spectre of Sterile Economics, with no place for people but only for
theorems, haunts the law. Judges must resist the temptation to accept
easy solutions.
The ratchet permits movement in one direction only. What was
once declared illegal must be illegal always, subject perhaps to some
tinkering at the edges. Business practices not yet illegal are, however,
candidates for condemnation. Neither Litvack nor Sullivan has any-
thing harsh to say about the Department's or the FTC's relentless ef-
forts to condemn additional mergers by extending the potential
competition doctrine, or about the FTC's attempt to abrogate the Col-
gate doctrine and thus condemn all efforts by manufacturers to influ-
ence resale prices.2 The unsuccessful campaign of litigation against
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank Douglas G. Baird, Richard A. Posner,
and Cass R. Sunstein for helpful iomments on an earlier draft.
1. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
2. See Russell Stover Candies, Inc., FTC Dkt. 9140, 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RPT.
135-69 (July 8, 1982), declining to follow United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)
(Manufacturer may terminate dealer that does not adhere to suggested resale prices.). See also,
eg., General Motors Corp., FTC Dkt. 9077, 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. Ryr. 78-111 (July 8,
1982), declining to follow FTC v. Official Airline Guides, Inc., 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cer.
denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981) (A monopolist of one product may decline to deal with prospective
customers for capricious reasons; only refusals to deal that reduce consumers' welfare are
unlawful.).
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IBM, which would have extended the scope of antitrust condemnation
significantly, is the subject of Professor Sullivan's praise.
My thesis is that there is no ratchet in antitrust and there ought not
to be one. The Sherman 3 and Clayton4 Acts authorized the Supreme
Court to invent and enforce a law of restraint of trade in the common
law fashion. The Court has consistently drawn on the common law
tradition.5 The common law evolves as circumstances change and
learning grows. Courts do not reject wisdom just because it comes late.
This is so in torts and contracts; it is true in antitrust as well.
The doctrines that Litvack and Sullivan invoke are the products of
common law evolution. The genesis of the rule against resale price
maintenance is the common law prohibition of restraints on alienation.
That principle merged, in 1911, with a concern about dealers' cartels
(which may have used manufacturers as cats' paws) to produce the per
se rule for resale price maintenance in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co. 6 The resulting rule embodied the concern for a dead
hand that produced misallocation of resources by banning free trade
and the concern for live hands that misallocated resources through car-
tels. One could express this rule in shorthand as protecting the "free-
dom of traders," one of Justice Black's favorite phrases.7
The shorthand had a life of its own, however, and in usual com-
mon law fashion was used as the justification for prohibiting practices
that affected only the individual judgment of businesses and threatened
none of the hazards that the Court perceived in Dr. Miles. Thus in
1968 the Court invoked the freedom of traders to prohibit maximum
resale prices as well as minimum ones, in a decision that stood the ra-
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1976).
5. Compare, e.g., National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) (Congress "expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on
the common-law tradition." (footnote omitted)), and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977) (overruling a prior case in common law fashion), with Texas Indus., Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643 (1981) ("The intent to allow courts to develop gov-
erning principles of law, so unmistakably clear with regard to substantive violations, does not
appear in debates on the treble-damages action."). See also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S.
432, 436 (1982) (Frequently "broad principles are articulated, narrowed when applied to new
contexts, and finally replaced when the distinctions they rely upon are no longer tenable."). All
that can be said of the contrary assertion by four Justices in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soe'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2478-79 (1982), is that it is unconsidered dictum. The parties to the case did
not seek the discarding of per se rules; they sought only to have their practices characterized in a
way that permitted evaluation under the Rule of Reason.
6. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
7. E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1945); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316, 321 (1966).
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tionale of Dr. Miles on its head.8 The preceding year it had used the
per se rule against territorial allocations, again with regard to the slo-
gan rather than the functions the slogan summarized. 9
Cases usually come to the Court long before scholars begin to ex-
amine the problem giving rise to the litigation. So it was with resale
price maintenance. By the time Lester Telser, extending the work of
Aaron Director, supplied a scholarly analysis of the problem in 1960
and showed that restricted distribution is in consumers' interests,' 0 the
legal rules and their rhetoric had long been a standard part of the train-
ing of every antitrust practitioner and judge. The rules had developed
without a sound understanding of their consequences.
It was to be expected that Telser's work would make itself felt
slowly, if at all, and then only through its gradual influence on stu-
dents, scholars, and practitioners. People who have taken a position
are reluctant to relinquish it no matter how clear the proof. "One
thinks that an error exposed is dead, but exposure amounts to nothing
when people want to believe.""
Robert Bork and Richard Posner, among others, amplified
Telser's analysis and made it available to the right audiences. 12 And
that work began to have effects. Dr. Miles and its progeny had been
based on suppositions about the consequences of vertical restrictions on
dealing. If it could be shown that the suppositions were wrong, at least
some people would be willing to change the rule. Part of the change
took place in Continental T V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 13 when the
Court abolished the per se treatment of location agreements. Other as-
pects of the rule may or may not survive the next ten years. 14 Whether
8. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Note 7 of the Court's opinion contains a
clear statement of the economic argument against prohibitions on vertical restrictions, which the
Court misunderstood as supporting its position. Id. at 151 n.7. See also Easterbrook, Maximum
Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886 (1981).
9. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
10. Telser, Mhy Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
11. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 219 (M. Howe ed. 1941) (statement by Oliver Wendell
Holmes). See also T. KUm, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
12. R. BORK, THE ANTrrRtusT PARADox 280-98, 429-40 (1978); Bork, The Rule ofReason
andthe Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and-Market Division (pts. 1 & 2), 74 YALE L.L 775 (1965), 75
YALE LJ. 373 (1966); Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.. 950
(1968); Bork, erticalRestraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171; R. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-67 (1976); PosnerAntitrust Policy andthe Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition De-
cisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach.
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHL L. REv. 6 (1981).
13. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
14. Compare California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (endorsing in dictum per se treatment of resale price maintenance), with Eastern Scientific
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they do is not, however, important to my point: one's support of a par-
ticular legal rule should depend on the contents of that rule, and not on
whether a court articulated the rule or some variant twenty or eighty
years ago. No serious scholar believes today that resale price mainte-
nance or any other vertical restriction is harmful to competition in the
absence of substantial market power, and several believe that these
practices are harmless even with market power. 15 Whether these schol-
ars are right or wrong, however, the objections to their position must be
on the merits and not on the basis of precedent or a misty-eyed vision
of a Golden Age.
The story is much the same for predatory conduct, the villain of
Professor Sullivan's piece. It was commonly thought that the Standard
Oil Trust achieved its position through predatory conduct, and the
Court's 1911 opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States reflected that
assumption. 16 The story of predation-the deep-pocket firm slashing
prices until its poorly financed rivals surrender, and then charging mo-
nopoly prices-has a ring of truth. All of us have read of price wars
followed by the exit of one or more firms. The concern about preda-
tory conduct is, moreover, in the mainstream of antitrust. Only
through predatory conduct (or some related exclusionary practice) may
a monopolist maintain its position. But for exclusion, competition will
spring up.
It is no surprise, then, that antipathy to exclusionary conduct lies
at the heart of antitrust doctrine. Yet here, too, additional experience
and additional thought are valuable in modifying received doctrine.
Apparently-exclusionary conduct is of legitimate concern only if it
works to drive out equally or more efficient rivals. If it does not work,
even in theory, then the best inference is that the low prices are based
on efficiencies. Perhaps no rival will leave the market. If a rival leaves,
the departure may be attributable to inefficiency relative to the larger
firm. (Of course, the low prices might also be unprofitable competitive
mistakes by a large firm. In that event, there is no need for antitrust.
Consumers receive a windfall, and the certain lack of profits is as dis-
couraging as the uncertain prospect of antitrust liability in preventing
Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (Ist Cir. 1978) (resale price maintenance
lawful when no more restrictive than lawful territorial restrictions), and Valley Liquors, Inc. v.
Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982) (restricted distribution lawful whenever
manufacturer lacks market power).
15. See, e.g., R. BORK, ANTITRusT PARADOX, supra note 12, at 291-98.
16. 221 U.S. 1, 47, 75-77 (1911). See L. BRANDEIS, COMPETITION THAT KILLS IN Busi-
NESS-A PROFESSION 236, 254 (1914) (calling cutthroat prices "the most potent weapon of
monopoly").
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recurrence.) The role of theory lies in clarifying the circumstances
under which exclusion could work, and therefore in providing the basis
for a conclusion whether a given practice was exclusionary (and thus
illegal) or competitive (and thus desirable).
One of the ironies of antitrust law is that so many predatory con-
duct suits are brought by firms that did not leave the market in re-
sponse to the supposedly heinous behavior of the defendants. One is
tempted to say that such suits speak for themselves. If the conduct was
designed as predation, it did not work. If it did not work in driving out
the rival, it was either (a) consistent with competition, or (b) self-penal-
izing, because it involved short-term losses without the realization of
long-term gains. In either case there is no reason to wheel out the anti-
trust cannon. The experience in ninety years of litigation over preda-
tory conduct by surviving rivals is a basis for reexamination of doctrine
in the common law fashion.
The other basis for reexamination is the developing scholarly anal-
ysis of exclusionary conduct. The first salvo came from John McGee,
another of Aaron Director's students, who reexamined the Standard
Oil case and found no evidence of predatory pricing.17 McGee's work
led to further inquiries and to further skepticism by scholars about the
efficacy of supposedly exclusionary conduct. Once more, Robert Bork
and Richard Posner were in the vanguard,' 8 although they were only
two voices among many. Once more, this scholarly work led courts to
begin to look anew at the assumptions of earlier years and to modify
doctrine in the common law fashion to reflect more accurately what
was known about the probable explanations for particular conduct. 19
The story diverges from that of vertical restrictions on dealing in a
significant way. As Professor Sullivan points out, there is no received
scholarly wisdom about exclusionary conduct proving that existing le-
gal doctrines are without economic foundation.20 Many scholars have
devised models of strategic behavior that lead to monopolistic out-
17. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137
(1958). See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECoN. 289 (1980).
18. R. BoRK, ANTrrRUST PARADOX, supra note 12, at 144-60; Bork, Rule of Reason, supra
note 12; Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506 (1974).
19. See, eg., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1438 (1982); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977).
These cases are among the many following Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing andRelatedPrac-
tices Under Section 2 ofthe Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975), an article that used the
same economic principles that informed the work of McGee, Bork, Posner, Telser, and others, to
derive concrete rules. See sources cited supra notes 16-17; Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the
Long Purse, 9 J.L. & ECON. 259 (1966).
20. Sullivan, Monopolizatiorn Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transformation of
the Law, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 587, 617-18 (1982).
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comes. Some of these models are farfetched, but others seem to reflect
conditions that obtain in real markets. They are cause for serious re-
flection. I have argued at length that these models of strategic behavior
are not a sufficient basis for antitrust condemnation of ambiguous busi-
ness practices, a view shared even by proponents of some of the strate-
gic models.2 ' Professor Sullivan apparently disagrees, for he adopts the
strategic view without considering its limitations.22
This disagreement must be resolved on the merits. Particular busi-
ness strategies either exclude equally or more efficient rivals, to the
profit of the excluder, or they do not. If they do not work profitably,
then to condemn them is to condemn competition, and competition is
what the antitrust laws are designed to preserve. It is no answer to say
that in 1911 or even in 1961 some court condemned a practice on the
basis of the best theories then available. We do not design airplanes on
the basis of the best theories available in 1911. Why design antitrust
law on that basis?
II
Mr. Litvack argues that if antitrust law is to move, the Antitrust
Division (and presumably the FTC) should push it in one direction
only. The Division is a prosecutor, the argument goes, and the goal of
prosecutors is to extend the law, not to contract it. Anything else ex-
21. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263
(1981). See also Eaton & Lipsey, Exit Barriers Are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a
Barrier to Entry, 11 BELL J. ECON. 721,728 (1980) ("Application [ofa strategic behavior model] to
policy is clearly premature."); Spence, Competition, Entry, andAntitrust Policy, in STRATEGY, PRE-
DATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 45, 79-81 (S. Salop ed. 1981) (cautioning against applying
strategic models to hunt for predation in antitrust cases). Spence and others who formulate mod-
els of strategic interaction are also careful to observe that the conclusions of their work depend on
adherence to the conditions. Thus Spence points out that the presence of uncertainty-a feature
of all real markets-may render unavailable the monopoly gains that could be had from strategic
commitments in a world of certainty. Porter & Spence, The Capacity Expansion Process in a Grow-
ing Oligopoly: The Case of Corn Wet Milling, in THE ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFOR-
MATION 259 (McCall ed. 1982).
22. Sullivan is quite selective in his use of economics. For example, although he relies on the
new models of strategic behavior to reject as "dated" McGe's treatment of predatory pricing, he
also makes some arguments so dated that no economic support could be advanced for them today.
One of these arguments is that large fn-ms that lease their goods thereby increase the entry barriers
facing rivals. Quite the opposite is true. A firm that owns a computer may resist junking it to buy
a new one from an untried vendor. The new entrant thus may have access to only a small part of
the growth of demand. But when the existing machines are under leases cancellable on 30 days'
notice, the new vendor has a shot at selling to almost the entire installed base. Customers can
cancel old leases and buy or rent as they please, confident that new leases from the dominant firm
would be available again if something should go wrong. If leasing really is a monopolistic device,
moreover, the rentals presumably are at a monopoly level. Although a firm that paid a monopoly
price some years ago to buy a computer might not want to buy another, a furm that is paying
monopoly prices today to lease a computer would leap at the chance to lease or buy at the compet-
itive price. The dominant firm's leases thus give entrants a decided edge.
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ceeds the bounds of prosecutorial discretion, unfairly taxes the re-
sources of private plaintiffs, and demoralizes the staff.
The argument about prosecutorial discretion rings hollow, coming
from a former Assistant Attorney General who, like many before him,
refused to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act23 at all, and based this
refusal on an economic approach that amounted to nothing more than
disagreement with the Congress that enacted the statute.24 The Robin-
son-Patman Act is a small-business protection statute; the Department
finds it objectionable because that protection comes at a substantial
cost in economic efficiency. Thus it declines to prosecute. And when
in 1978 the Solicitor General represented the FTC in litigation, taking
a view of the statute that seemed almost compelled by its language and
history, Mr. Litvack's predecessor declined even to sign the brief.2 5
These decisions seem wholly legitimate. Prosecutorial discretion en-
compasses a refusal to file classes of cases as well as refusals to file
particular examples of a class.
At all events, William Baxter's decision not to file cases alleging
resale price maintenance, tie-ins, and some related practices is not a
refusal to enforce the Sherman Act. It is, rather, a decision to allocate
limited prosecutorial resources to merger and price-fixing cases, where
Baxter thinks they will do the most good. True, this means that some
aspects of the Sherman Act as it has been construed in some cases will
not be enforced by the Department. But the Act itself will be enforced,
and surely Mr. Baxter will follow the policy of Thomas Campbell, his
prosecutorial counterpart at the FTC, in filing a restricted distribution
or tie-in case if harm to consumers' welfare can be established. 26
What Baxter and Campbell are doing has a long and respectable
history. After the Supreme Court's merger decisions in Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States,27 United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,28 and United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co. ,29 Donald Turner issued merger guidelines
(for which Mr. Litvack offers praise) announcing the Division's unwill-
ingness to proceed against mergers that plainly would have been un-
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
24. See U.S. DnePT OF JusTicE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (1977).
25. See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission, Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69
(1979) (Oct. Term 1978, No. 77-654). The Court ultimately decided the case by construing all
doubts in favor of the economic approach to competition, a treatment that would have shocked
Representative Patman, and thus reversed the Commission's decision.
26. Compare the FTC cases cited supra note 2, with the statements of Mr. Campbell in an
interview with BNA reported in 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 238-40 (July 22,
1982).
27. 370 U.S. 297 (1962).
28. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
29. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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lawful under those cases.30 The refusal to proceed against mergers that
were unlawful under prevailing interpretations of the law is more seri-
ous than a refusal to proceed against resale price maintenance because,
as a practical matter, only a suit by the government can halt or undo a
friendly merger,3 1 while private actions are effective against other
practices.
Perhaps it is true that Baxter's and Campbell's prosecutorial deci-
sions discourage the staffs of the Division and the FTC. It is not clear,
however, why we should find this troublesome. The staff is not run-
ning the show and ought not to be. Of course the staff would feel better
if the top of the hierarchy shared its views, but it cannot be true that the
government should be organized so that the rank and file is in charge.
The staff embodies the institutional wisdom of the Division and is enti-
tled to a respectful hearing on points of dispute, but to no more.
The role of the Division and the Commission is not just to prose-
cute the dickens out of businesses, always searching for "more" than
whatever the law provided before. The highest officials must leaven
their zeal for enforcement with some concern for competing interests.
It is too simple for a "mission" agency such as the Antitrust Division,
the EPA, or OSHA, to set off in pursuit of one objective (cleaner air,
more safety, lower concentration) without regard to costs. There is
some right amount of enforcement, and some proper mix of objectives,
for which the political appointees must be responsible. The mix cannot
be found by consulting cases; the cases are bound to contain a melange
of conflicting statements and little guidance on how to handle the co-
nundrums.32 The political appointees must find their own mix, largely
on the basis of the wisdom they bring to their offices.
Just as the Division has never prosecuted every kind of behavior
that a court would condemn, so it has never attempted to take all anti-
30. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (defining a market of
shoe retailing and holding that a merger achieving a 5% share is unlawful, especially where the
market is fragmented and no other firm would be larger), and United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270 (1966) (holding that, in the unconcentrated grocery store market in Los Angeles with
several larger firms, a merger producing a firm with 7.5% of sales is unlawful), and United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (defining Wisconsin as a market and holding a merger
unlawful because, although markets are generally unconcentrated, and it is easy to import beer
from other states, the merger produced a firm with 24% of sales there and over 4% nationwide in a
market experiencing increased concentration), with Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, I
TPADa REG. RaP. (CCH) 1 4430 (1968), § 3(ii) (a state is not a market when imports are un-
hindered) and § 6 (in unconcentrated markets the acquisition by one firm with a 5% share of
another firm with a 5% share, or of 10% and 4%, will not be opposed).
31. And, I have argued elsewhere, the same should be true for unfriendly acquisitions. Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits By Targets ofTender Offers, 80 MICH. L. Rav. 1155 (1982).
32. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982).
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trust doctrines to the limits that one motivated only by prosecutorial
zeal might. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,3 the Division
did not argue for a per se rule;34 in Pabst and Von's the Division ar-
gued for interpretations of the Clayton Act much more restrained than
those the Court adopted. 35 In United States v. United States Gypsum
Co. 36 the Division argued for a rule of reason treatment of informa-
tion exchanges among competitors, even though the United States v.
Container Corp. ofAmerica 37 seemingly supported a per se approach. 38
The Division has appeared as amicus curiae in support of both plain-
tiffs and defendants with some regularity. (Appearing as amicus seems
altogether better than attempting to influence the law by filing suits in
which one does not believe and then contriving ways to lose the litiga-
tion.) In at least three cases during the Carter administration, the Divi-
sion, as amicus curiae, took the side of the defendants in the Supreme
Court.39 In others it took the side of the plaintiff, but in all cases the
decision about which side to take rested on both a careful analysis of
the law and thought about the direction in which the law should move.
The Division responded as an evaluator and analyst of the law, not
merely as a prosecutor.
III
At bottom, Litvack and Sullivan object not so much to the fact
33. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
34. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., id., with Brief for the United States,
Schwinn (Oct. Term 1966, No. 25).
35. Compare United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966), with Brief for the
United States, Pabst (Oct. Term 1965, No. 404), and United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270 (1966), with Brief for the United States, Von's Grocery (Oct. Term 1966, No. 303).
36. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
37. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
38. Compare United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), with United
States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See Brief for the United States in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (Oct. Term 1977, No. 76-1560) (reason-
ing that a per se rule is inappropriate because exchanges of information often lead to economically
efficient decisions about price and level of output).
39. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (supporting defendant on basis of economic analysis); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (oppos-
ing application of antitrust laws, resting on economic analysis); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Group Life & Health Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (supporting
application of antitrust laws to drug purchase agreement but observing that conduct in question
was not a substantive violation). In other cases the Department took a restrained view of antitrust
principles. E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (arguing that in the particular circumstances of the case
municipal action was subject to antitrust scrutiny); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (arguing, as the Court held, that actions were
immune from antitrust scrutiny under state action doctrine).
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that antitrust law evolves as to the direction in which it is evolving.
Baxter, Campbell, and the judges who are the objects of Sullivan's crit-
icism take the view that antitrust law has the purpose of improving
consumers' welfare (or, to put it slightly differently, of increasing the
allocative efficiency of the economy). Litvack and Sullivan hold that
antitrust has multiple purposes, including preserving the existence of
autonomy of small businesses at the expense, if need be, of some sacri-
fice in allocative efficiency. Neither Litvack nor Sullivan would sacri-
fice too much efficiency; they ask courts to inquire, case by case, how
much sacrifice is worthwhile.
Both of these competing positions are honorable ones, and the dis-
pute about the goals of antitrust is of long standing. In other writings
Professor Sullivan has been one of the most eloquent exponents of one
position.4° That different interpretations have been held so widely and
for so long is one symptom of the fact that in antitrust, as so often for
other statutes, questions of legislative purpose cannot be answered by
resort to the speeches of the drafters. They must be answered, if at all,
by resort to arguments about the structure and consequences of the leg-
islation, and these arguments take a form that will not convince anyone
who does not already share with the proponent a set of fundamental
principles.
Moreover, when the fundamental principles are themselves the
subject of substantial disagreement within society, the disagreement is
unlikely to be resolved by a series of judicial decisions or by congres-
sional action. The disagreement is sufficiently deep that it will influ-
ence the Court's decisions and tug different ways on legislators. Thus
the Sherman Act is written in the language of "competition," an eco-
nomic term, and its proponents seemed concerned about cartels rather
than the preservation of small firms, but the Robinson-Patman Act was
designed to undermine competition and protect small firms. The Clay-
ton Act uses economic language, but its legislative history contains
powerful strains of populism. 41 The Supreme Court's decisions wobble
back and forth, sometimes praising competition and calling for eco-
nomic inquiry, sometimes condemning efficiency as a source of evil.42
40. See Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Rela-
tionships, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980); Sullivan, Economics andMore Humanistic Disciplines: What
Are the Sources of Wisdomfor Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. Rev. 1214 (1977).
41. Compare W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1965), and Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966), with Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960), and Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of
Exclusive Dealing Arrangements under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 267.
42. The extremes may be Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9-
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One cannot look at the cases or the legislative history and say with
certainty that the statutes have a particular goal or set of goals. It is
therefore hard for Litvack and Sullivan to maintain, as they do, that
those who take an economic approach to antitrust are somehow be-
traying the statutes-as if the statutes had a clear purpose capable of
being disobeyed.
When the statute does not convey a purpose, it is necessary to pro-
ceed as if there were one. Choosing a purpose is inevitably a task of
creation rather than interpretation. The legislative history and the stat-
ute's structure may place many constructions out-of-bounds, but they
do not dictate the choice more precisely. I think the antitrust laws
should be treated as if their sole objective were increasing allocative
efficiency. Judge Bork, Professor Areeda, and Donald Turner have
made this argument as well as we are ever likely to see it made,43 and
those who are not persuaded by their arguments are not going to be
persuaded by anything else that can be said for this position. I add
only a few marginal thoughts.
It may once have been possible to support an "inhospitality tradi-
tion of antitrust," which called for courts to strike down business prac-
tices that were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradition an inference
of monopolization followed from the courts' inability to grasp how a
practice might be consistent with substantial competition. The tradi-
tion took hold when many practices were genuine mysteries to econo-
mists, and monopolistic explanations of mysteries were congenial. The
same tradition emphasized competition in the spot market. Long-term
contracts, even those arrived at by competitive processes, were deemed
anticompetitive because they shut off day-to-day rivalry. The imple-
mentation of an inhospitality tradition might eliminate some sources of
efficiency but was unlikely to do much damage over the long run, so
long as the rules affected all participants in the market and so long as
the deepest skepticism was reserved for a few concentrated markets.
Whatever their merits, though, such policies must be reevaluated as the
costs of executing them change. And change they have.
For many products the United States is no longer a market. The
industries that appear most concentrated within the United States-
automobiles, steel, computers, pharmaceuticals, and so on-are now
10, 19-20 (1979), and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.21 (1977), on
the side of economic analysis, and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), on the other. The list could be extended to
arbitrary length.
43. R. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 12, at 15-89; 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTrrRUST LAW 11103-13 (1978).
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international markets.44 The "concentration" is an artifact of market
definition. When the market extends beyond the United States, the use
of antitrust policy to give "breathing space" to small domestic firms by
handicapping larger firms does not have that effect at all. Antitrust
policy simply reduces the extent to which domestic products compete
with foreign products. Small American firms lose out all the same, but
to large foreign firms rather than large domestic firms. The sacrifice of
some efficiency for other valuable ends fails; the sacrifice is real, but
the other ends are not achieved. It makes no more sense to try to de-
concentrate the domestic market and try to preserve small firms in the
United States than it would make to try to deconcentrate steelmaking
in Pennsylvania or airframe manufacturing in Washington. Similarly,
rules that penalize long-term contracts and thus make coordination
more difficult and costly may put domestic firms at a disadvantage to
foreign rivals.
A similar problem crops up in domestic markets, although it is less
serious. If, for example, a merger is declared unlawful in order to pre-
serve the independence of the smaller, absorbed firm, as in Von's and
Pabst, the larger firm may simply grow and evict the smaller from the
industry. The growth takes longer and is, one supposes, more costly
without the merger, but in the end the smaller firm is still gone.45
A related problem is that a multi-goal antitrust policy is unpredict-
able and unprincipled. If some efficiency is to be sacrificed to some
other ends, then judges can reconcile any decision, in any case, with the
policy. The policy most favorable to small businesses is a policy of
unlimited cartels and mergers. Monopoly prices make it easy for small,
inefficient fringe firms to prosper; mergers snap up small businesses
and reward their proprietors and, of course, have the same benefits for
fringe firms as do cartels, if the mergers lead to higher prices. Compe-
tition is bad for inefficient firms; that's why small businesses like the
Robinson-Patman Act.
Now a policy of subsidizing small businesses or preserving tradi-
tional forms of business organization might be worth the price. One
can imagine tax laws or certain forms of regulation that create such
44. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 963-72
(1981). Of course, the ability of foreign producers to divert products into the United States varies
from product to product, and defining an international market does not always show that the
domestic producers, taken as a group, lack market power.
45. The beer market is as good an example as any. After a series of cases, including Pabst,
had brought acquisitions to a halt, the largest firms began to build new and especially efficient
plants and to ship nationwide. This hastened the demise of small, independent brewers. See F.
SCHERER, A. BECKSTEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MURP'Y, THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERA-
TION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY 248-49 (1975).
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preferences but do not seriously reduce allocative efficiency. But the
attempt to create the preference through antitrust breeds erratic results.
Few receive the preference, yet its costs are spread through business as
a risk premium on all undertakings. The greater the risk of a new ven-
ture or a different contractual arrangement, the less likely it will be
introduced. Antitrust policy produces the costs of risk without (neces-
sarily) conferring the sociopolitical benefits contemplated. Legislation
might have a better chance of targeting benefits at lower cost.
One might respond that an economic approach to antitrust is no
easier to implement. Phalanxes of economists may descend on a court
seeking to peddle the latest theories, and courts are rarely in a position
to evaluate technical arguments. Granted. At the same time, an eco-
nomic approach would lead to simplification of many antitrust ques-
tions that courts now find vexing. Almost all vertical arrangements
and pricing decisions would be lawful per se under an economic ap-
proach. Small merger cases would be thrown out on summary judg-
ment. Other per se rules, such as those against price fixing and larger
mergers, would remain in place. The number of cases presenting genu-
inely difficult problems to be resolved by trial would be much reduced.
Most questions of theory would be addressed by the appellate tribunals
in the process of formulating rules, and the number of confrontations
between experts in court need not be large. Certainly the problems
under a wholly economic approach are no greater than those con-
fronting the courts when they address tricky questions of market power
and other economic issues and then proceed to sociopolitical issues.
The per se rules now in place entail questions of characterization just as
nasty as those we would encounter under an economic assessment.46
IV
There has been a drift in antitrust in recent years toward an eco-
nomic approach. A number of cases follow the economic view; a rather
smaller number do not. Many find ways to avoid the problem. The
Supreme Court seems deeply divided, disposing of cases by 5-4 or 4-3
votes. Lower courts and enforcement officials cannot be expected to
find in this mass of precedent any clear path. This makes it a propi-
tious time for the Division and the Commission to chart their own
courses and lead the courts rather than follow them.
46. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soe'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). See also Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 901-10.
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